As an extension of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS), secure channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) has been considered. Generic construction of SCF-PEKS (with adaptive security) from strongly existentially unforgeable one-time signature, selective-tag CCA secure tag-based encryption (TBE) and anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) has been proposed in ISC2011. Since this construction follows the double encryption, where a ciphertext of anonymous IBE is encrypted by TBE, hybrid encryption is applied because usually the ciphertext space of IBE is not equal to the plaintext space of TBE. In this paper, we show that hybrid encryption is not necessary as long as previously-known anonymous IBE schemes are used as a building tool of adaptive SCF-PEKS. Our result leads to a composability of IBE schemes whether they can be applied for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS or not. Moreover, since we can exclude DEM part, our construction is efficient compared to the original one.
INTRODUCTION

Research Background
Any encryption scheme is required to be secure in the following sense: no information of plaintext is revealed from the corresponding ciphertext. Therefore, it seems hard to achieve to realize a searchable functionality against encrypted data. Due to such requirement, Public key Encryption scheme with Keyword Search (PEKS) has been proposed (Boneh et al., 2004b) . In PEKS, a receiver makes a trapdoor t ω for a keyword ω, and uploads it on a server. A sender makes a ciphertext of a keyword ω ′ by using the receiver's public key, and sends it to the server. The server outputs 1 if ω = ω ′ , by using t ω , and 0 otherwise. Moreover, Secure-Channel Free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) have been proposed (Baek et al., 2008; Fang et al., 2009; Gu and Zhu, 2010; Gu et al., 2007; Khader, 2007) as an extension of PEKS. In SCF-PEKS, the server has a public/secret key pair, and the sender makes a ciphertext of a keyword ω ′ (which is encrypted by using both the server's public key and the receiver's public key), and sends it to the server. The server outputs 1 if ω = ω ′ by using the trapdoor t ω and its own secret key, and 0 otherwise. Even if t ω is sent via an insecure channel, no entity (except the server) can run the test procedure. Note that a malicious receiver can use the server as the test oracle according to the following way (see Fig.1 ). 1. A malicious receiver computes (or eavesdrops on) a trapdoor, and uploads it to the server.
• From the viewpoint of the server, this is the same as uploading a trapdoor from a valid receiver.
2. The malicious receiver computes (or eavesdrops on) a SCF-PEKS ciphertext, and sends it to the server.
• This is the same as sending a ciphertext from a valid sender.
3. The malicious receiver can obtain the result of the test algorithm.
To capture such circumstance, Emura et al. (Emura et al., 2011) consider a strong security notion of SCF-PEKS, called adaptive SCF-PEKS, where a "malicious-but-legitimate" receiver can be admitted to issue test queries adaptively, and show that adaptive SCF-PEKS implies timed-release encryption (Matsuda et al., 2010) . they also gave a generic construction of adaptive SCF-PEKS based on anonymous IBE, selective-tag chosen-ciphertext (IND-stag-CCA) secure tag-based encryption (TBE), and strongly existentially unforgeable (sUF) one-time signature (OTS). Briefly, this construction follows the double encryption, where a ciphertext of anonymous IBE is encrypted by TBE. Since usually the ciphertext space of IBE is not equal to the plaintext space of TBE, they applied the KEM/DEM framework (Shoup, 2000) (a.k.a. hybrid encryption), where KEM stands for key encapsulation mechanism, and DEM stands for data encapsulation mechanism.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we investigate the usage of hybrid encryption in the original construction, and show that hybrid encryption is not necessary as long as previously-known anonymous IBE schemes (e.g., (Boneh and Franklin, 2003; Boyen and Waters, 2006; Camenisch et al., 2009; Caro et al., 2010; Ducas, 2010; Gentry, 2006; Seo et al., 2009) ) are used as its building tools. Our result leads to a composability of IBE schemes whether they can be applied for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS or not. We define IBE with Partitioned Ciphertext Structure (PCS-IBE), where for any common message M and distinct identities ID and ID ′ (ID = ID ′ ), a part of ciphertext can be "commonly" used for both ciphertexts if the "same random number" is used for both encryptions. Technically, this ciphertext shareability is the most significant point of the security proof, and such novel simulation technique has not been pointed out so far. Moreover, since we can exclude the DEM part of previous adaptive SCF-PEKS construction, our construction is efficient compared to the original one. Especially, we can reduce the ciphertext size. Note that the size of DEM part is at least the same size of IBE ciphertext, and the ciphertext size is bottleneck point of adaptive SCF-PEKS constructions compared to the concrete constructions. Finally, we instantiate an adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme which achieves the similar level efficiency for the costs of the test procedure and encryption compared to the (non-adaptive secure) SCF-PEKS scheme without random oracles proposed by Fang et al (See Table 1 ). Since we do not care about the keyword guessing attacks (Byun et al., 2006; Jeong et al., 2009; Rhee et al., 2009b; Yau et al., 2008) , it can be an interesting future work.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give the definitions of the building tools and adaptive SCF-PEKS.
Definitions of IND-stag-CCA Secure TBE
In the following, T AG and M T BE are a tag space of TBE and a plaintext space of TBE, respectively.
Definition 1 (Syntax of TBE).
A TBE scheme (Kiltz, 2006) Correctness is defined as follows: For all (pk, sk) ← TBE.KeyGen(1
Figure 2: TBE experiment.
IBE-IND-CPA
define the advantage of A Adv (1 κ ) in Figure 3 , and define the advantage of A Adv
Here, EX T R AC T is the extraction oracle for input of an identity ID it returns the corresponding secret key sk ID . Note that ID * is not allowed as input to
EX T R AC T in the IBE-IND-CPA experiment.
An IBE scheme Π is said to be IBE-IND-CPA secure if the advantage Adv IBE-IND-CPA
Next, we define anonymity experiment of IBE under CPA (IBE-ANO-CPA).
Definition 5 (IBE-ANO-CPA). For any PPT adver-
sary A and the security parameter κ ∈ N, we define Table 3 , and 
Definitions of sUF OTS
In the following, M Sig is a message space of OTS. (Bellare and Shoup, 2007) Correctness is defined as follows: For all (1 κ ) is negligible.
Definition 7 (Syntax of OTS). A strongly existentially unforgeable (sUF) OTS against adaptively chosen message attack (CMA) (e.g.,
(K s , K v ) ← Sig.KeyGen(1 κ ) and all M ∈ M Sig , Verify(K v , σ, M) = 1 holds, where σ ← Sign(K s , M).
Definitions of Adaptive SCF-PEKS
Here, we introduce security requirements of SCF-PEKS defined in (Emura et al., 2011) . In the following, K is a keyword space. 
Definition 9 (Syntax of SCF-PEKS.). An SCF-PEKS
where λ ← SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk R , pk S , ω) and t ω ← SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(sk R , ω).
Next, we state two security requirements "consistency" and "keyword privacy". (1 κ ) as follows. 
The SCF-PEKS scheme Π is said to be computationally consistent if the advantage Adv SCF-PEKS-CONSIST
Next, we state two security notions for keyword privacy, "indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack with the server's secret key" (IND-CKA-SSK for short) and "indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack with all trapdoors" (IND-CKA-AT for short). In the IND-CKA-SSK experiment, an adversary A is assumed to be a malicious server. Note that A computes (pk S , sk S ), and gives pk S to the challenger. So, we omit sk S in the IND-CKA-SSK experiment. (1 κ ) is negligible.
Next, we define the adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment. In this experiment, an adversary A is assumed to be a malicious-but-legitimate receiver or outsider.
Note that A computes (pk R , sk R ), and gives pk R to the challenger. So, we omit sk R in the Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment. (1
Here, T EST is the test oracle for an input (λ,t ω ) 
PREVIOUS ADAPTIVE SCF-PEKS CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we introduce the original generic construction of adaptive SCF-PEKS based on anonymous IBE, IND-stag-CCA TBE, and sUF OTS. In this construction, a ciphertext of an anonymous IBE scheme (say C IBE ) is used as a "plaintext" of a TBE scheme to hide keyword information from an adversary. From the result of the decryption of the TBE scheme, the ciphertext C IBE must be obtained. In addition, usually, C IBE ∈ M T BE . By using TBE KEM (e.g., Section 6 of (Kiltz, 2006) ), compute (K T BE ,C T BE ) ← TBE.Enc(pk,t), and encrypt C IBE as a plaintext of the CCA secure DEM such that C DEM = E K (C IBE ).
Therefore, they assumed C IBE ∈ M T BE , and Protocol 1 (Previous Adaptive SCF-PEKS Construction (Emura et al., 2011) ).
SCF-PEKS.KeyGen
, and output (pk S , sk S ).
, and output (pk R , sk R ).
SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(sk R , ω):
Run t ω ← IBE.Extract(sk R , ω), and output t ω .
SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk
, and 0 otherwise.
IBE WITH PARTITIONED CIPHERTEXT STRUCTURE (PCS-IBE)
The role of the KEM/DEM framework in the original adaptive SCF-PEKS construction is that an IBE ciphertext is regarded as a TBE plaintext to hide keyword information from an adversary who has mk in the Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment. In this section, we define a class of IBE, called IBE with partitioned ciphertext structure (PCS-IBE) to avoid hybrid encryption 1 .
Definition 13 (PCS-IBE). IBE is said to be PCS-IBE if its ciphertext C IBE can be split into two parts
) with the following properties.
• C IBE,1 ∈ M T BE .
-Kiltz (Kiltz, 2006) ) and (C ′ IBE,1 ,C IBE,2 ) are valid ciphertexts. This structure is used for computing the challenge ciphertext in the proof of the adaptive IND-CKA-AT. In the proof, no matter which plaintext (C 0,IBE,1 ,C 1,IBE,1 ) is encrypted, both C 0,IBE,2 and C 1,IBE,2 can be used as a part of the challenge ciphertext, since C 0,IBE,2 = C 1,IBE,2 due to the PCS property.
Here, we explain the above structure in the Gentry IBE (Gentry, 2006) 
OUR ADAPTIVE SCF-PEKS CONSTRUCTION BASED ON PCS-IBE
In this section, we give our adaptive SCF-PEKS construction based on PCS-IBE, IND-stag-CCA secure TBE, and sUF OTS.
Proposed Construction
Let a ciphertext space of the underlying PCS-IBE be
Protocol 2 (Our Adaptive SCF-PEKS Construction w/o Hybrid Encryption).
SCF-PEKS.KeyGen
SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(sk R , ω): Run t ω ← IBE.Extract(sk R , ω), and output t ω .
SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk
Note that non-adaptive SCF-PEKS, where no test query is considered in the IND-CKA-AT experiment, can be constructed by reducing the one-time signature part and replacing the TBE part with CPA-secure PKE as follows: Let the underlying IBE be PCS (i.e.,
where (C IBE,1 ,C IBE,2 ) ← IBE.Enc(pk R , ω, R) and C PKE ← PKE.Enc(pk S ,C IBE,1 ).
In the original adaptive SCF-PEKS construction (Emura et al., 2011) , the DEM part C DEM = E k (C IBE ) is included in the ciphertext. On the contrary, since the size of C DEM is at least the same size of C IBE , by excluding the DEM part, the size of ciphertext of our construction is smaller than that of the first one. Concretely, let λ 1 be a ciphertext of the original construction, and λ 2 be a ciphertext of our construction. Then, |λ 1 | ≥ |λ 2 | + |C IBE,1 | holds. Since the ciphertext size is bottleneck point of adaptive SCF-PEKS constructions compared to the concrete constructions, we can say that our adaptive SCF-PEKS construction is more efficient than the previous one, although is not fully generic.
Security Analysis
In this section, we show the security proofs of our construction. Note that the proofs of consistency and IND-CKA-SSK are same as these of the original ones presented in (Emura et al., 2011) . So, we omit these proofs. Proof. We show that there exists an algorithm B that breaks the IND-stag-CCA security of the underlying TBE scheme using an adversary A who breaks the adaptive-IND-CKA-AT security of SCF-PEKS. Let
, and sends t * := H tag (K * v ) to C as the challenge tag. C runs TBE.KeyGen(1 κ ), and gives pk to B. B sets pk as pk S . A runs (pk R , sk R ) ← IBE.Setup(1 κ ), and gives
, and answers as follows: t = t * : B can use the DEC oracle of the underlying TBE scheme as follows.
1. B forwards (C T BE ,t) to C as a DEC query of the TBE scheme.
2. C answers C ′ IBE,1 ← TBE.Dec(sk,t,C T BE ).
• Note that if t is not the legitimate tag of C T BE , then C answers ⊥. In this case, B answers 0.
returns 1, and 0 otherwise.
then B gives a random answer in C , and aborts.
In the Challenge phase, A sends the challenge keywords ω * 0 and ω *
and computes the challenge ciphertext (by using the PCS property) as follows:
1 , R * ) using the same random number (i.e., C 0,IBE,2 = C 1,IBE,2 ).
B sets
C * IBE,2 := C 0,IBE,2 .
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• Note that both (C 0,IBE,1 ,C * IBE,2 ) and (C 1,IBE,1 ,C * IBE,2 ) are valid ciphertexts of the underlying IBE scheme. This is the reason we require anonymous "PCS"-IBE.
2. B sends (M * 0 , M * 1 ) := (C 0,IBE,1 ,C 1,IBE,1 ) to C as the challenge messages.
where µ ∈ {0, 1} is the challenge bit.
Then, λ * is a valid ciphertext due to the PCS property.
Again, let (SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk S , pk R , ω j ) :=
, and answers as follows:
In the case t ω j ∈ {t ω * 0 ,t ω * 1 } : 2. C answers C ′ IBE ← TBE.Dec(sk,t,C T BE ).
returns 1, and 0 otherwise. 
In the case t
ω j ∈ {t ω * 0 ,t ω * 1 } : (C IBE,2 ,C T BE , K v , σ) = (C * IBE,2 ,C * T BE , K * v , σ * ) : B returns 0, since (C * IBE,2 ,C * T BE , K * v , σ * ) is an SCF-PEKS ciphertext of either ω * 0 or ω * 1 . (C IBE,2 ,C T BE , K v , σ) = (C * IBE,2 ,C * T BE , K * v , σ * ) : B
The GKBS Construction
Here, we instantiate an adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme based on the Gentry (PCS) anonymous IBE (Gentry, 2006) , the Kiltz IND-stag-CCA-secure TBE (Kiltz, 2006) , and the Bellare-Shoup sUF one-time signature (Bellare and Shoup, 2007) . We call it the GKBS construction by picking up the authors' name. Let G and G T be cyclic groups of prime order p, e be an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G × G → G T , and H sig : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} * → Z p be a CR hash function, where each κ-bit key K specifies a particular hash function H(K, ·) with domain {0, 1} * . We assume the difficulty of the one-more-discrete-log (omdl) problem (Bellare et al., 2003) , the decisional augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (decisional ABDHE) problem (Gentry, 2006) , and the gap decision linear (gap DLIN) problem (Kiltz, 2006) , and the collision resistance of H tag and H sig . Then, Let ME(G) and ME(G T ) be the computational costs of multi-exponentiation in G and G T , respectively, BM be that of one bilinear map computation, and |G|, |G T |, and Z p be the bit-length of the representation of a element of G, G T , and Z p , respectively. More precisely, we assume that the security parameter κ = 170. So, p is a 170 bits prime, |G| = 171 bits and |G T | = 1020 bits, i.e., we assume that G be an elliptic curve defined over finite field F p and G T be a multiplicative group on finite field F × p k with the embedded degree k = 6. In this case, the computational complexity over G T is approximately three times higher than that of G. So, we estimate ME(G T ) = 3ME(G), and write them in Table 1 2ME(G) + 3ME(G T ) ME(G) + 2ME(G T ) + 2BM 2|G| + 2|G T | No (Fang et al., 2009) (11ME(G)) (7ME(G) + 2BM) (2382 bits) GBBS 4ME(G) + 2ME(G T ) ME(G) + ME(G T ) + BM 3|G| + 3|G T | No construction (10ME(G)) (4ME(G) + BM) (3573 bits) GKBS 8ME(G) + 2ME(G T ) 5ME(G) + ME(G T ) + BM 7|G| + 2|G T | + |Z p | + κ Yes construction (14ME(G)) (8ME(G) + BM) (3577 bits) the above SCF-PEKS instantiation is adaptive secure in the standard model.
Protocol 3. An adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme without random oracles (the GKBS construction)
SCF-PEKS.KeyGen S (1 κ ): Choose g 1 $ ← G and x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 $ ← Z p . Choose g 2 , z ∈ G with g x 1 1 = g x 2 2 = z. Compute u 1 = g y 1 1 and u 2 = g y 2 2 . Output (pk S , sk S ) = (g 1 , g 2 , z, u 1 , u 2 ), (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) . SCF-PEKS.KeyGen R (1 κ ): Choose g, h $ ← G and α $ ← Z p , compute g ′ = g α , and output (pk R , sk R ) = (g ′ , h, e(g, g), e(g, h)), α . SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(sk R , ω): For a keyword ω ∈ Z p , choose r ω $ ← Z p , compute h ω = (hg −r ω ) 1 α−ω , and output t ω = (r ω , h ω ). SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk S , pk R , ω): Choose R $ ← G T , s, r 1 , r 2 , x, y $ ← Z p , and K $ ← {0, 1} κ . Compute X = g x , Y = g y , set K v = (K, X,Y ), and com- pute t = H tag (K v ), C IBE,1 = (g ′ g −ω ) s , C IBE,2 = e(g, g) s , R · e(g, h) −s , C T BE = g r 1 1 , g r 2 2 , (z t u 1 ) r 1 , (z t u 2 ) r 2 ,C IBE,1 · z r 1 +r 2 , c = H sig K,Y ||(C IBE,2 , C T BE , R) , and σ = c + yx mod p. Output λ = (C IBE,2 ,C T BE , σ, K v ). SCF-PEKS.Test(λ, sk S ,t ω ): Parse sk S = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ), t ω = (r ω , h ω ), C IBE,2 = ( f 1 , f 2 ), C T BE = (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 ), and K v = (K, X,Y ). Compute t = H tag (K v ),′ IBE,1 = v 5 /(v x 1 1 · v x 2 2 ), R ′ = f r ω 1 · e(C ′ IBE,1 , h ω ) · f 2 , and c = H sig K,Y ||(C IBE,2 , C T BE , R ′ ) ,
Comparison
In this section, we estimate the efficiency of the GKBS construction. Although concrete SCF-PEKS schemes have been proposed (Baek et al., 2008; Gu and Zhu, 2010; Gu et al., 2007; Rhee et al., 2009a) , these schemes are proved in the random oracle model. So, we focus on SCF-PEKS schemes proposed by Fang et al. (Fang et al., 2009 ) and Khader (Khader, 2007) , respectively, which are secure in the standard model. Khader (Khader, 2007) shows that PEKS and SCF-PEKS can be constructed by using k-resilient IBE (Heng and Kurosawa, 2006) (which is an IBE scheme, where an adversary can obtain at most k private keys of IDs). Since k-resilient IBE (Heng and Kurosawa, 2006 ) is designed by applying DDH-hard group without pairings, Khader PEKS/SCF-PEKS also enables pairing-free constructions. Unfortunately, Khader PEKS/SCF-PEKS require k-dependent large number of public keys and high encryption costs. So, here we compare our GKBS construction to the Fang et al. SCF-PEKS scheme (Fang et al., 2009) in Table 1 . Moreover, we instantiate a non-adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme called the GBBS construction which is based on the Gentry IBE (Gentry, 2006) and linear encryption presented by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham (Boneh et al., 2004a) . We give the actual construction of this non-adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme in the Appendix. The GBBS construction achieves the same security level of the Fang et al. construction. Although in the GKBS construction the length of the ciphertext is larger than that of the Fang et al. construction, the computation of the Test algorithm is faster (if BM > ME(G) which usually holds). So, there is not much difference between our GKBS construction and the Fang et al. scheme in terms of efficiency, even though our construction supports adaptive security.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we show that adaptive SCF-PEKS can be constructed without relying on hybrid encryption by using PCS-IBE. Since previously-known anonymous IBE schemes have PCS-IBE property, our adaptive SCF-PEKS construction works as long as previously-known anonymous IBE schemes are used. Since we can exclude the DEM part, our construction is efficient compared to the original one.
